Who to Blame? John Frost on Operation Market Garden’s Failure WW2

Colonel John Frost led 2nd Battalion of the
British 1st Airborne Division to Arnhem bridge on the 17th of September 1944. His was the only battalion to reach the objective,
and he was widely acknowledged as the most experienced paratroop commander in 1st Airborne
Division. In his book “A Drop Too Many”, which was
published after Cornelius Ryan’s book, A Bridge Too Far, and after the film of the
same name, A Bridge Too Far, Frost gives his reasons for the failure of Operation Market
Garden. He states- “The same voice that had so firmly said
to Roy Urquhart: ‘Arnhem Bridge. And hold it,’ said to James Gavin, G.O.C. of the
U.S. 82nd Airborne Division, ‘The Groesbeek Heights. Nijmegen Bridge later.’” Nijmegen Bridge was not taken on day 1, leading
to a critical 36 hour delay, by which point Frost’s battalion was annihilated and Arnhem
was solely in German hands. The 36 hour delay was caused because the 82nd
Airborne Division delayed their advance on the Nijmegen Bridge on day 1. By the time they got going towards the bridge,
after seven and a half hours of sitting around at the Groesbeek Heights, it was too late. Part of a German panzer division arrived and
dug in at Nijmegen, preventing the two platoons of American paratroopers that did eventually go to Nijmegen from taking the bridge. The next day, these platoons were withdrawn
back to the Groesbeek Heights to protect it from the German 406th Division, which was
neither a division nor a threat to the 82nd Airborne. When XXX Corps arrived at Nijmegen at the
beginning of day 3, with the whole day to go the last 8 miles to Arnhem, it had to fight
for the city and bridge at Nijmegen, with the help of the 82nd Airborne. After a 36 hour delay, it was too late to
save Frost’s battalion and Market Garden ultimately failed. Frost places the blame on the person who prioritized
the Groesbeek Heights, a small hill to the East of Nijmegen, over the critical Nijmegen
Bridge. That person was General Frederick “Boy”
Browning, the commander of 1st Airborne Corps. In Frost’s version of events, Browning ordered
General Gavin of the 82nd Airborne not to go for the Nijmegen Bridge until the Groesbeek
Heights were secure. The main reason Frost gives for this was because
Browning wanted to set up his HQ on the Heights. He also mentions that there was a rumour about
German armour in the Reichswald – a forest slightly further east from the Groesbeek Heights. This was only a rumour and never confirmed,
and in reality there was nothing in the Reichswald at all. Frost does not lay the blame of the failure
of Operation Market Garden on Gavin of the 82nd Airborne, instead praising him and his division for their crossing of the Waal river in boats as “one of the bravest feats of all time.” Frost places the blame for the most critical
error in the Market Garden operation on Browning. “However, by far the worst mistake was the
lack of priority given to the capture of Nijmegen Bridge. The whole essence of the plan was
to lay an airborne carpet across the obstacles in southern Holland so that the Army could
motor through, yet the capture of this, perhaps the biggest and most vital bridge in that
its destruction would have sounded the death-knell of the troops committed at Arnhem, was not
accorded priority. The capture of this bridge would have been a walk-over on D-day, yet
the American 82nd Airborne Division could spare only one battalion as they must at all
costs secure a feature called the Groesbeek Heights, where, incidentally, the H.Q. of
Airborne Corps was to be sited. It was thought that the retention of this feature would prevent
the debouchment of German armour from the Reichwald in Germany. This armour was there
by courtesy of rumour only and its presence was not confirmed by the underground. In fact,
as a feature it is by no means dominating and its retention or otherwise had absolutely
no bearing on what happened at Nijmegen Bridge.” Frost goes on to say that Browning and his
HQ were “nothing more than a nuisance” and should have remained back in Britain,
out of the way. Noticeably, he doesn’t call out Browning
by name. But he makes it very clear who he’s on about. Now, in my documentary on Operation Market
Garden – links everywhere – where I went into detail about every aspect of the battle, I
concluded by blaming General Gavin of the 82nd Airborne. And I did that because some historians think
he was ultimately to blame for not taking the Nijmegen bridge, and he himself admits
it was his decision. But he also says he got permission to prioritize
the Groesbeek Heights from his Corps commander – which was Browning! So was Frost right? Was Browning ultimately to blame for the failure
to take Nijmegen bridge, and ultimately the person we need to blame for the failure of
Operation Market Garden? I’d love to hear your thoughts in the comments
below. Thanks to my Patreons, I’ve just purchased
a biography on General Frederick Boy Browning, and I cannot wait to make a video on this bad boy. And I know a lot of people hate Montgomery
– mainly Americans – but I don’t think Monty is the big bad guy of this battle. That honour definitely goes to Browning. His treatment of Sosabowski – the Polish general
– is just … unforgivable. But I’m going to try and remain as neutral
as possible – even though all the evidence I have from every other source is damning
– and I will give him and his biographer a chance to set the record straight. And this is the challenge of history – trying
to remain balanced, open-minded, calm, collected, and willing to consider all views before making
a decision. I’m going to make a video on Browning. I’m going to leave it there, thanks for
watching guys, bye for now.

100 thoughts on “Who to Blame? John Frost on Operation Market Garden’s Failure WW2

  1. If Eisenhower had let Patton get the resources he needed instead of Monty would the war have been over sooner?

  2. G'day,

    Yay Team !

    If in Doubt, when apportioning blame for any Military Disaster in which Britain was involved – blame a pompous arrorogant hubristic British Officer for getting his shit wrong.

    From the Zulu Wars to the Boer War, Gallipoli to Dunkirk. Malaya & Dingapore & Burma to Crete, Greece Tobruk & Dieppe, to leaving their Infantry & Marines onboard Ships, to be bombed, burned & sunk by the Argentine Air Force in the Malvinas ("Falkland Islands") Campaign ; in every Military Fuckup they ever had an opportunity to contrive, the British Oroficer Corps worked very hard, and dilligently, to snatch Disaster from the Jaws of Victory.


    Such is Life…


    Ciao !

  3. I think they're both to blame. Really, Frost is to blame as well if he saw the plan and didn't object. This was so deeply fundamental, the WHOLE POINT of the air-drops was to seize the bridges before they could be reinforced or destroyed… why even drop at Nijmagen?

    Maybe if this oversight had been corrected then something else would have screwed the operation, like lack of air cover, but the plan DID in fact go according to schedule up until that point, but the delay from the bridge not being taken was so critical.

  4. Gavin would've been crucified if Browning was lost. His account basically was designed to cover for Browning.
    Similarly, Browning's comments ( and scapegoat ) existed to cover for Monty.
    The TRUE reason for MG was Churchill's insistence that the Nazi V1 and V2 launch sites be captured — yesterday. If you look at the projected capture zone its is EXACTLY the location of SS rocket launches.
    THIS ^^^ is the reason that Monty told all that 95% (IIRC) of their objectives had been achieved.
    Churchill is the reason why Ike agreed to Monty's great plan — without running by his staff. In normal times, Ike ALWAYS ran big plans past Tedder, his right-hand man. MG got going far too far for Tedder to stop it.
    MOST of the blame has to go to Monty because he didn't do what he normally did. He 'unloaded' a shocking amount of the planning onto Browning.
    Which was a MAJOR gaff, as few commanders ever were as versed at a set-piece battle as Monty. That was his greatest strength. It's why he was an Army Group commander.
    The drop zones were ALL SCREWED UP. The 101st didn't need to even attempt to save the Son crossing. That task should've been 100% for XXX Corps… from the first.
    Then the 101 should've been dropped right between the two critical bridges. There was no FLAK there.
    XXX Corps should've been given hundreds of jeeps so that mounted infantry could have shot cross country.
    These are the kinds of things that Monty was famous for getting right.
    I have to blame Monty for basically being AWOL for this battle.
    I think he had Victory Disease.

  5. BTW, for those who care: British experts revisited MG and its defective radios.
    It turns out that even under IDEAL conditions ( Salisbury plain ) the British radios could only ever transmit and receive ~ 2 to 3 miles. Yes, that's in perfect weather and without any buildings or hills in the way. They were simply not long range sets. The "wrong crystals" bit in the film is totally incorrect.
    The guys planning this op at the top had no idea that their radio sets had such limited range, for when they were training back in England, everything seemed fine. The gear had simply never been vetted// tested for MG. You know what's said about assumptions.

  6. Had Browning stayed in the UK on the first day he could shrug off responsibility on Gavin. However since he was in direct face to face contact with Gavin he should have ordered Gavin to secure the bridge following the original plan. Some could say that he was not paying attention to what Gavin was doing specifically while he was gathering the full picture of the battle. However he would have to rely of radio intelligence from all other units which could understandably be delayed in reporting while he should have expected reports from Gavin commands progress in real time and should have been curious why he had not heard that the bridge had been taken or what was going on with it. However it is claimed he knew nothing was going on with the bridge so he can not even claim that he did not know. Yes, Gavin fails directly but Browning fails for not over riding him. Frankly the way Gavin reports that he made the decision but his commander ok'd it, makes me wonder if Gavin was shielding Browning by shifting the brunt of the blame on to himself.

  7. Monty's grand idea so ultimately Monty is to blame. However Browning is the fool that had priorities wrong not Frost. Such is war when individual wants override the needs of the operation meaning the bridge at Nijmegan. Having spent time in this exact area I can clearly understand that the bridge is key. This is mostly low farm land which tanks would never be able to drive across. Thanks for the analysis…

  8. Browning is too blame.
    Failire to correctly prioritise targets.
    in an operation to capture bridges, he put the bridge as a seccondary goal.

  9. Balance d and unbiased. This is a good wish. But venuring an opinion, though worthy, is the expression of bias.

    Better, perhaps, to have the opinion, express it, and be aware of the bias that one does have.


  10. Johnny Frost always blamed Browning for this stuff up. And in my opinion he was correct. From my observations of Browning, it seems that he hit the nail on the head.

  11. Sean Connery at first did not wish to cooperate with the making of "A Bridge Too Far." He was concerned it would be promoted as a blatant 'Glorious Defeat' whereas he was of the opinion it was just a collossal failure. So it wasn't just the director who had a low opinion of certain top Allied commanders. I mean, come one General Urquhart… Getting lost for a full day by getting stuck between enemy forces? He should have properly informed his back-up that, should anything happen to him (Urquhart), his back-up would have free reign in command of the operation.

  12. I'll conceived plan from the start. Look at the time table. Landings weren't all accurate. Trying to shove all your armor down one main road. It wasn't a battle it was an ego trip

  13. tik: i had a short discussion with you about a year ago on this battle. ("it's the Americans' fault. spoken like good Brit.") just saw "a bridge too far (Not!) Horrock, Carrington refuse" which touches on our discussion.
    i've done a passing study on kursk. the russian and german historians have spilt almost as much ink refighting the battle as the soldiers originally spilt blood. unless it is a clear cut victory or defeat i really don't know how one can evaluate battles. local leaders will exaggerate their success and downplay their failures all the way up the line to the generals. eyewitness testimony is equally unreliable. military history is a really difficult area to determine truth.

  14. The best American army commander, Eichelberger, was busy fighting the Japanese, as was Krueger. Also, the best British army commander, Slim, was fighting the Japanese. In any event it’s unseemly that we Americans, so powerful, so often fall into the trap of refusing to look critically at our own screw ups and blunders. We react like weaklings instead of like those truly strong.

  15. What about the fact they had to use boats to cross the river to attach the bridge from the other side. The boats took forever to reach the bridge by trucks for the soldiers to cross. The narrow road and driving through the liberated town's caused a major delay to deliver the boats. That was a suicide mission for the 82nd airborne to cross the river.

  16. There are several big mistakes made in Operation Market. For example, NOT believing – or ignoring – the intelligence reports of German Armor in the vicinity of Arnhem before the drop even began. Or having 6th Para land so far away from their own objective. And of course the failure to take Nijmegan bridge in a timely fashion. If the Red Devils had known they would be landing on top of an SS Panzer Division, they certainly would have planned a little differently.

    But most of those mistakes are made because the Allies underestimated the German's capacity to resist. Even the tanks of XXX Corps ran into unexpectedly heavy opposition from AT guns when Operation Garden kicked off. The allies had believed the German occupation forces in Holland had been shattered and disorganized. They had been – but they re-organized very quickly in response to this offensive.

  17. I disagree with Frost in not attaching any blame toward Gavin. Sure, Browning was at fault too but ultimately Browning let Gavin make the real decisions. Browning specifically told Gavin on the 18th that the Nijmegen road bridge MUST be taken on the 19th or at the very latest by the morning of the 20th. It was Gavin who didn't make sure his orders to move without delay on the bridge after dropping were fully understood by Col Lindquist of the 508th and it was Gavin who took the decision to withdraw all 82nd troops away from Nijmegen on the 18th, not Browning.
    Let us also not forget that the British 1st Airborne failed to even arrive at Arnhem in sufficient numbers and nor did they ever take the whole Arnhem bridge, only the northern end. General Roy Urquart of 1st Airborne meekly let the RAF get away with it's choice of drop zones and did not argue his case as he should have done. What did Frost ever say about that? The 1st Airborne has to share some of the blame. There were no German tank attacks against the 1st Airborne on the day they dropped, the 17th, and they had a reasonable number of anti tank guns with them anyway.

  18. One of the truths in the film is that the failure couldn't be put down to a single issue. It would of been a master stroke if MG brought the war to an end in 44'.

  19. The reason Nijmegen bridge wasn't taken on D-Day is because Browning told Gavin to not take it until the Groesbeek heights were secured. He also dropped them near the German border, which was naturally crawling with reinforcements.

    I believe had Ridgway been in command of operation Market, things may have gone better. In Guy LoFaro's book; 'The Sword of St. Michael; the 82nd Airborne Division in World War II,' Ridgway was the prime candidate to lead the operation. The US had more Airborne divisions committed to the operation, Ridgway had more combat experience, etc. But in the end, Brereton chose Browning which shocked Ridgway, who had been his rival since North Africa and the 'Red Beret incident.' This isn't my biased opinion as an American either, Ridgway was just a more capable leader.

    So it seems unfair when people blame Gavin and the 82nd for the failure of the operation, when they were only acting under orders. Also, the reason they didn't split up on D-Day to take both the heights and the bridge, is because the Division was going to be dropped over the course of several days, due to the lack of enough planes to get them there all at once.

  20. Browning is to blame, definetly. He ORDERED Gavin to secure the heights first before taking the bridge. So Gavin can't really get any blame, because he was just following his orders.

  21. A daring plan by the Monty. Eisenhower had other ideas. A character of this Battle Operation Market Garden would be rash to draw any conclusions much less blame. May the Brave English N American Soldiers who died in this smothering slithering tragedy Rest in Peace….

  22. Hindsight is 20/20. Remember that. I like and appreciate your vids. I'm subscribed. Regardless, remember how easy it is to say if only…
    Best Regards, M. Sullivan

  23. I know of no American sentiment characterized as hatred for Montgomery. Maybe it exists, but I have never heard of it from any source. His achievements against Rommel are sterling.

  24. So how was this the 82nd? If Browning a British General, whom was in overall command? Not only that but the delay with 101st who did not secure their bridge, but had to build one with British Engineers? Also, wasn't this a British mission?

  25. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander European Theater. He Ok d Montys flawed plan. Thats assuming it would have succeed IF Niemagan (spelling I know) bridge was captured AND held. I am American and I rather like Monty.

  26. The problem was not one minor engagement or other lost or delayed but the overarching supply situation. The Allies were at the end of their supply lines, Antwerp was taken too late, the French rail network was previously destroyed by the Allies who needed it now and the trucks just were not enough to supply the Allied armies … there was simply not enough logistics capability to mount such an offensive at that point. "Home by Christmas" was too optimistic and too grand in scope. I would blame Montgomery not the smaller local commanders on the ground.

  27. Montgomery ultimately was to blame he was only glory seeking to make a name for himself he wanted to be Knowles as the one who ended the war in Germany if you dig deeper he was jealous of General George Paton a devised market Garden he as far as I'm concerned gave no thought about the loss of life this operation. Would glean

  28. I find it interesting that people say the Op was doomed to failure from the start. Had the Nijmegen bridge been secured early on, and had the bridge at Son not been destroyed by the Germans, then the Op could well have been a rip roaring success if XXX Corp had been able to advance into Arnhem on the first or second day.

  29. Both Generals are to blame, it shows a lack of experience and what the mission statement was, capture all three bridges not cover a flank or setup a Corps HQ!!!
    Lack of intelligence or terrain homework would have determine before they jumped what the 82nd could, would have taken first or provide additional assets to take both simultaneously!

  30. I have to ask whether taking Nijmegan Bridge would have been truly decisive. The armored thrust along the many-bridge route was being hampered by tough German resistance; unless the follow up assault reached Nijmegan, taking the bridge would have counted for nothing. I have to say again that Market Garden was flawed because too many things had to go perfectly. Of course, if for some reason the Germans' confused retreat hadn't been brought under control in time, the plan might had had a chance of success. But that's a big "if."

  31. Having watched this, your excellent one on the whole of Market Garden and also the one on Browning (I watched this one last), there's something I've not been able to work out.
    IF the amount of armour reported to be in the forest was in fact there, the whole operation made no sense (at least not in terms of capturing Arnhem).
    Even worse, surely the best available defendable position was Nijmegen itself; witness the difficulties 30 Corps had dealing with the German forces that moved in.
    Seems to me the better idea would be to take the whole division to capture the bridge then fortify it and the surrounding city. If we consider how difficult it was for the Germans ultimately to destroy Frost, what hope would an attacking force have against the bulk of the 82nd dug in at Nijmegen?
    OK, I admit hindsight has its perils. I suppose one issue might have been subsequent drops of supplies and elements of the division (which speaks to the whole question of accepting 1 drop a day and using part of one to bring Browning); have to wonder if they couldn't have found something more suitable.
    Regardless, seems a little bizarre. Anything strong enough to need the whole division defending the heights was unlikely to be stopped by them, plus if the whole division was required to do that then clearly it couldn't be spared to capture the bridge and thus the plan fails. Any lesser force that tried to interdict the road would have the 82nd north of them and 30 Corps coming from the south, not a very attractive proposition I'd have thought.

  32. I'm so glad I watched your entire series on Market Garden! I feel that I finally understand it! I've been an "armchair" military historian since I was 8 and realized there had been more than 3 wars in all of history, LOL!

    Operation Market Garden always seemed doomed from the start to me. Perhaps I was prejudiced by the title of Montgomery's book, "A Bridge Too Far" as it implies geography and not human error was to blame for the failure. Your series completely altered my perception.

    Market Garden was entirely winnable for the Allies, but they'd have had to be completely nuts to try it the way they did! (Therefore, I conclude, they were completely nuts.) First off, it is immediately apparent that the drop zones were too far from Arnhem. The Germans would have had half a day to recognize the threat and then destroy Arnhem bridge under the best case scenario. In the event, the Germans had even more time (and still failed to destroy both the Nijmegen and the Arnhem road bridges). Second, close air support/ground attack fighters were the key to neutralizing German armor. Any plan that called for dropping a sizeable body of men 100 km behind enemy lines to seize and hold critical objectives with nothing but small arms and completely unsupported for 72 hours was insane! Two words: King Tigers. 'Nuff said. Third, CLEARLY STATED OBJECTIVES were needed. E.g., Montgomery himself should have called in every man with a star on his lapel and personally clarified that seizing and holding THE BRIDGES over the rivers and canals until XXX Corps came up was the TOP PRIORITY for the airborne units. (Duh. Why bother with the parachutists at all if they weren't going to go for the bridges?) But I do get that at Normandy the airborne landings were to guard the flanks of the seaborne beachheads. 82nd did a much better job of doing that at Nijmegen than they had at Normandy where they wound up scattered all over heck and gone by a busted up night-time operation. BUT THAT WASN'T THEIR JOB THIS TIME!! Or at least, it should not have been. The "Bridge too Far" wasn't too far after all. The book should have been called "Good Strategy; Poor Tactics" or something.

  33. Every single video you create is a gem my friend…..
    I want to tell you that it’s a CRIME that you don’t have a million subscribers.
    So insightful and informative….. as a WW2 enthusiast myself, most everything you talk about, I already know….. however, you still manage to always teach me something new with every topic.
    Keep up the outstanding work. I wish you all the best, and I will be becoming a patreon supporter of yours this week.

  34. the whole damn operation is flawed in the beginning i think many commanders from the US and British are skeptical to the whole operation

  35. Were Browning and Gavin to blame for the failure ? The Market Garden plan was 'signed off' by Brereton. He was responsible for the 1st Allied Airborne Army. He knew that all the bridges had to be taken with 'thunderclap surprise' so why did he okay a plan that relegated the Nijmegen bridge to the lowest priority ? It was Brereton who approved the flight plan of General Williams that so hamstrung the Airborne commanders and ignored all the Airborne tactics.

  36. I do not understand your desire to blame Gavin. Browning was there, and the superior officer. If he wanted the bridge taken day one he was in position to make it happen.

  37. The plan was ridiculous- the execution mediocre. Browning was the husband of Daphne du Maurier who claimed he was haunted by the failure of this operation post war.
    Nijmegen wasn't the only issue – the drop zones for Arnhem were 8 miles from the bridge. It was amazing 2 Para even got there with a Panzer division resting in the town.

  38. Ultimately Montgomery because it was a singular thrust and hence “easy” to stop with the movement of reserves. I use the term “easy” with notation because it is relative given the nature of war. The assumption the the Germans (pronounced Gerr-mans, like Sosabowski) were unable to react was a grave underestimation of the enemy and can be compared to Operation Shingle which took place approximately 100 days earlier. (more on that later)
    But given the nature of the question who was responsible for the failure within the operational boundaries of market garden it would be the delays encored to XXX corps and the drop sites given to 1st Airborne and even the 82 Airborne. Dropping the entire 1st Airborne south of Arnhem bridge and dropping one half of the 82nd north of Nijmegen would have placed them in a Cul-de-sac defensible and placed the supply drops for both divisions in the center. Not that they needed a defensible position but it would’ve made it easy to attack directly across both bridges with the entire division in the British case and if the Americans had dropped 1/2 North and 1/2 south of the bridge they would have taken it on the first day. I Do you understand that splitting the division 1/2 north and 1/2 of South of the river the Americans would have entailed risk but that would have allowed the taking Nijmegen bridge first and Grave bridge second. Nijmegen bridge was irreplaceable the Grave bridge was replaceable. The concerns About the flag at Arnhem bridge and the terrain south of Arnhem must ring hollow because it’s exactly were they dropped the Poles. Also the dispersement available transport was botched because they should have allocated priority to the first airborne. It was far out on the limb and therefore should have been dropped all at once with in the 101st being given less transport because it was closer to XXX corps.

    Yes the 82nd airborne should’ve taken the bridge it was assigned on D day (the 17th) but ultimately it’s delay was only 24 hours. If it has been standing there with bridge in hand when XXX corps rolled up on the 19th on time the Irish guards armor would not have been able to make it to Arnhem because the 43rd division was still 24 hours behind and the armor was not going to operate independently without infantry divisional support, Especially in between Nijmegen and Arnhem.
    The end around amphibious landings at Anzio show how adept the Germans were at planning and movement of reserves. As a result general Lucas said afterwards “Never try and supply a corps up a single road”

    Stalin, Zhukov and Rokossovsky were planning the destruction of army group center And Rokossovsky said he wanted to attack at two places. Stalin said to Rokossovsky “One strong blow is better than two weak blows” R Rokossovsky Corrected Stalin which must’ve took some balls and said t”Two strong blows are better than one strong blow.”

    So in closing your supposition that market garden failed because of the 82nd airborne is demonstrably false because of the delays suffered XXX corps even if the Vanguard had made it there on time ultimately it would’ve been delayed because I didn’t all arrive there at one time.

    One thing you fail to mention Is that if 82nd airborne had gone straight to the Neimegan bridge and taking it or attempted to take it the explosives would have gone off they were set it was only the battle of the river crossing that caused the disconnect of explosive charges. It is problematic I understand but if the 82nd airborne had attempted to take the bridge on time and/ or was close to successful the Germans would’ve blown the bridge. as it is the delay caused the bridge not to be blown And the delay was the only thing that kept the bridge standing

  39. Also your statement that the 82nd delayed the advance by 36 hours is off because 30 corps reached Nijmegen mid morning on the 19th 48 hours give or take after the start of market garden. The delay was 24 hours. And if Browning Wanted the bridge taken on D day he could’ve walked on over toGavin And ordered him to take it

    I have played almost every game and simulation of market garden and some of them are serious simulations and it never works no matter how hard the allies try. too many Germans not enough time and bad LZs.

    Also one thing most people do not realize is that even if a German Panzer division has lost all his tanks it still has its men. Panzer division were one part tank & two parts infantry.

    On D-Day the allies knew exactly where 60 of the 62 German divisions were in France. One of the two unknown divisions was directly behind Omaha beach. That was only 100 days before the event at Market garden.

  40. Murphy's law of war: All plans go to hell after the first round is fired. The Market garden operation was doomed to failure because it required precise timing and movement.

  41. Montgomery was well-liked by the American public until his book came out well after the war. The book and the pissing matches with American and British commanders shredded his reputation.

  42. The americans already had an account to let the compete plan of MG to fall in the hands of germans. Politically, the "rooseveltian" political strategy was to favor the russians and exploit their own ally, and let the Russians to bear the major burden of european front.. They give the opportunity to the russians to capture Berlin, and generally, save american sources what they used at the Pacific region. Moreover, the nuke was not buit and nobody knew it would work, so the russiasn needed for the future invasion of Japan. Moreover, if they let the russians to capture major parts of Central Europe, the europians later would more depend to their defender, US Army against the Soviet Union. That was the Roosevelt's heritage to the americans.

  43. I added a comment on your excellent video on Market-Garden. The 36 hour delay prevented xxx corps from relieving 2 para at Arnhem bridge a single battalion of 1st Parachute Division. It seems to me that the operation was compromised by a cascade of flawed decisions and perceptions from Brereton on down. To lay the failure at the feet of Gavin or Browning is I believe short sighted.

  44. General Horrocks, Montgomery and Prince Bernhard, Graf (Count) zur Lippe-Biesterfeld and Prince of Orange-Nassau by marriage.

    " In this photograph, Montgomery discusses the strategic situation with Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks (left), commanding XXX Corps, and Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands on 8 September 1944."

    The Dutch government had known he was a member of the Nazi party. Not that his monocle and his feint German accent didn't give him away. He worked for IG Farben's corporate espionage headquarter NW7, named after their postal code in Berlin. He was the head of the Princess Irene Brigade. He was also partly the inspiration for Ian Fleming's James Bond. After WWII, he joined David Rockefeller to co-found the Bilderberg Group in 1954.


    IG Farben and the Rockefellers' Standard Oil were in hundreds of kartel agreements, throughout WWII. Standard Oil supplied Germany with tetraethyllead, an anti-knock agent, which allowed the Germans to use their coal reserves to make fuel.

    More here:

  45. Sorry but most of these historical figures I associate with the actors who played them in The Bridge Too Far movie. General Browning played by Dirk Bogarde and Sosobowski played by Gene Hackman.

  46. TIK why don t u blame Monty for it? is Monty such gold star in your books? or he had no flaws? right… cause Monty was the man how wanted this OP in the first place? sure Browning Command 1st Airborne Corps and overall command of the ground operations, but it was Eisenhower how approved it before it started and Monty how "worked it out, with its flaws" which resulted in the backfire mission called Operation Market-Garden. sure blame Gavin for it, he was tasked first to secure and hold Nijmegen Bridge and 2nd task could have been Groesbeck Heights, so it was an error of decisions there, it didn t affect the Wars outcome, but the loss of life still, was shambles and should be blamed on Monty and him alone.

  47. As if you can ever point to one single aspect in an operation like this.
    Eisenhower was forced into giving Monty his way. Is it Ike's fault?
    Monty's plan was overly ambitious. Was it Monty's fault?
    The German forces were underestimated. Intelligence to blame?
    Logistics were more difficult than anticipated. Their fault?
    Browning, Gavin, Private Ryan?….. Get real.

  48. Gavin was the one who blundered, but since Browning was his superior he must take a lot of the blame as well. There's more than enough blame to go around; Montgomery also deserves blame because he was Browning's boss.

  49. Hard to judge a war situation from an armchair. Blame is an opinion only, facts on the ground should be the basis of history.

  50. Sure, it was a bad decision, but BLAME is quite the weasel word. In any management structure that I've been involved in, the one who planned and was entirely in charge of the project is responsible for each milestone and risk management of the project. Maybe they didn't use those new fangled business terms back then, but there is only one person to blame. Eisenhower for allowing the hair brained scheme for even being considered. Eisenhower was brow beat by Churchill to listen to Montgomery, and against his better judgement, left him charge at Caen when he should have been relieved, gave Monty supplies for his fixed piece battles when Patton was already breaking out to the south, and game Monty full support for this joke of an operation. Not in hindsight, but at the time, it was obviously a "hail mary pass," that had very little chance of success. Any risk manager would look at the three bridges, with precise timelines, and no flexibility and cancel the whole thing before it ever started. So yes, if you want to use the weasel word BLAME, I'd say Eisenhower for not standing up to Churchill earlier and sending Montgomery home in July.

  51. I agree that the delay in capturing the Nijmegan bridge was of prime importance in the failure of MG.

    However, there was a fatal flaw in the planning stage which seems shocking to me. Priority for aircraft should most definitely have been given to 1st Airborne and the Poles. This is not merely hindsight… the British and the Poles had the longest to wait for relief, and therefore it seems obvious to me that dropping them all on the first day would have insured the capture and holding of the Arnhem bridge. Further, I would have planned a drop of light troops on the softer but much closer area south of the Arnhem bridge on day one, which is near where Sosabowskis men were ultimately dropped anyway. This would have insured the taking of the entire bridge at once.
    The 101st, with the nearest objective to 30 Corps starting line, should have been given last priority for transport, as they would be relieved the quickest.

    My two cents.

  52. Any assault where so many lives are dependent on taking a bridge over a river is a very high risk to begin with. Forget about why they did or did not take it. The Germans could have easily detonated the bridge, or it may have been more heavily fortified than expected. Maybe it was just the whole concept of Market Garden and not the execution that was the problem. There is so much analysis of weeds, when maybe we were just in the wrong garden.

  53. It took the planes two hours to drop the 82nd paras. Browning was at the end of the jump. Those troops assigned the bridge jumped first, along with Gavin, two hours ahead of Browning. Browning was still in the air when the 508th should have been marching towards the bridge. The 508th should have been attacking the bridge as Browning was landing. They should have seized the bridge from the 18 guards by the time Browning cleared his drop zone. I cannot see where Browning is to blame. I can see where Gavin is though.

  54. operation market garden was a huge mistake getting 3/4 of the 1st airbourne division wiped out you don't drop light infantry with limited ammo hundreds of miles behind enemy lines with supporting heavy forces hundreds of miles away on three panzer divisions with heavy infantry. they knew they were their yet they ordered them to jump they were thinking more about their ego than the soldiers lives.

  55. Gavin was ordered by Browning to take the hill BEFORE taking the bridge:

    "…This hill mass went up to one hundred meters and dominated the countryside for many miles. It had been used as a maneuver area by both the Dutch and Germans and was well known. It is the only high ground in all of the Netherlands. At a conference at the headquarters of the British Airborne Corps on September 16 (D minus 1) General Browning directed the CG of the 82nd

    >>> "not to attempt the seizure of the Nijmegen Bridge until all other missions had been successfully accomplished and the Groesbeek-Bergendahl high ground was firmly in our hands." <<<

    This expression of the Corps commander's evaluation of the separate portions of the mission given the 82nd Airborne Division was most helpful since the Division was to be so widespread.

  56. I feel this was more of a strategic failure than a tactical failure. The plan for 30 Corps to be in Arnhem within a day was far too ambitious. Clearly the Germans weren't done fighting at that point. And the questionable landing area for the British airborne was just suicidal. 7 miles from the objective? Even if they had tanks on hand that's still too much ground for a light infantry unit to cover. Great video

  57. TIK, I feel it would be profitable for you to think through what Warren’s experience would have looked like had he departed three hours earlier. You never discuss what this fight might have looked like. What would the following 24 hours have unfolded?

  58. Had it succeeded, there is no doubt whatsoever that Field Marshall Montgomery would be lionized as the boldest general in the 20th Century. IMHO.

  59. TIK, love your take on this form of revisionist History lad. Thank you. My points as a retired US Infantry soldier of the 7th, 101st, & 1st CAV divisions as an NCO and History Major bring me to several other key points in reference to the "total picture" of MG:

    #1) Anti-tank load responsibility to Urquhart–even after being shown the "likely non operational" German tanks near Arnhem. records? Urquhart oughta've loaded up more PIAT's, and AT rounds for his 6pounders…(yes, we fall back to the 10 planes of Bad boy Browning's HQ here, and more boots and less suits on the ground day 1, apologies). Still, suspecting it–that's an ignored threat by Urquhart as Div C-in-C 1Para.

    #2) "Rumored 1,000 Panzers in Reichswald" forest: A) Sep 13th SHAEF date of this scuttlebutt exists. Great–My questions there Q: with the unquestioned Allied Air Superiority, why no Air recon to confirm it? B) Peripherally, we have now ULTRA records of intercepts is there ANY beginnings of the later Operation Watch on the Rhine (Battle of the Bulge) build up to substantiate this rumor? C) If this was dumped as well last minute to Gavin (82nd Abn) like the Air recce photos of panzers near Arnhem to Urquhart, what as the anti-tank preparations given to the unit, knowing they'd seek Groesbeek Heights for overwatch positions at Nijmegen against this counter attack threat?

    #3 US Army tactical doctrine is seize an objective, then dig in to prepare for counter attack in the Infantry. SEIZE, the HOLD for ABN Infantry…Gavin did the reverse–he changed the mission & Commander's intent by preparing against a counter attack before taking an objective = Nijmegen Bridge. He should have been sacked for insubordination. Now my Bias–I'm a Screaming Eagle veteran. I've never been 82% sure, but I am 101% sure Gavin screwed the pooch here when he put step 2 (defend) before step 1 (seize the OBJ–THE BRIDGE).

    #4) I noted in your previous videos there were more ABN units in Theater (US 17th ABN, UK 6th PARA, SAS BDE, etc), and of course the Air-landing UK 54th for the Airfield seizeure that never happened, (but was allotted, and scheduled, Boots at the airfield waiting) In argument of "more Paras needed")… Now to my recollection, wasn't the SAS with some units involved down south of this frontage operating behind German Lines, for which later after the war the SAS and UK Army held the SS and Gestapo who rounded them up tried and hanged? So there were paras out, and planes off to them away from MG.

    I would also like to see records of what was total transport aircraft available by USAF & RAF transport commands in Theater, not JUST the 100 dedicated to MG. Correlation here for those I've lost already–>The Germans operated their panzers post June 6th in daylight by hiding out, and moving by night. Where are the Typhoons? Where are the P47's dedicated to Strafing/ Air-to-ground attack during/ after June 6th D-Day?

    I ask these because IF Gavin & 82nd ABN had taken Nijmegen and the bridge, with Air support they could've had their own Bastogne till XXXth Corps arrived. And surely to God and Bloody hell where was the Air Support on call if 1,000 panzers were in the bleeding Reichswald during MG (granted the bad weather delay day can be counted out that stuck the Poles a day behind their drop)? I'd love to know what the RAF & USAF fighter commands that had that role were doing besides escorting bombers over German cities…

    Sorry this long Tik.

  60. The failure was ultimately down to Brereton who refused to commit all of the necessary transport aircraft to the operation, making it impossible to land all of the airborne troops in one landing on the first day as the original concept required. This was the critical decision that doomed the operation, if all the airborne troops had been landed as intended, they would have been able to secure all objectives.

  61. The basic plan was doomed to failure from it's inception. With a only single axis of advance, and the airborne landings marking this axis out for the Germans as clear as day, the Germans could concentrate their defenses on that single line of advance. Even had the allies seized each bridge on schedule, this single line of operation would have met a concentrated defense. Unless you have overwhelming superiority, such a single line of advance almost always fails.

  62. The essence of the whole plan was to capture the bridges, with that being said Gavin should not have been distracted by the Heights. He more than anyone else knew this was a distraction of their efforts.

    But, the fundamental error in this whole operation was the lousy intelligence going into it, not to mention the defective radios. It was too daring an operation, frankly. Even so, it came close to success due to the massive efforts of so many. Pity.

  63. According to Ryan, Browning also both ignored intelligence that should have affected commencement of the plan and had the intel officer responsible for identifying the potential threats basically dismissed from the operation.

  64. I don't know? Browning saying Groesbeek before Nijmegen? If this is about resource /objective management and the Groesbeek is vital, keep troops there. But at the same time as Gavin is securing the Groesbeek, he has a whole Regiment securing the bridges over the canals and river at Grave. These are narrow canals easily bridged by Baily or even folding bridges. The Waal is the only river before Arnhem that can't be bridged with engineers. So priority should be Nijmegen bridges, then the Groesbeek (if its that much of a worry) and then Grave.   Groesbeek, Grave, Nijmegen makes no sense. It's practically reverse.

    Did Groesbeek have to be held? Lightly equipped paratroopers on the high ground wouldn't keep determined german panzers at bay, but the dense defence of an urban area like Nijmegen town could, thats where I would have put my defence. I would have let XXX Corps take Groesbeek, yes you give up artillery spotting ground to your enemy but only for a day or two when the enemy is still getting a grip.

    Every document / memo and briefing leading up to take-off priorities the bridges. The spirit of commando/airborne forces is to ignore flanks and features and go for the vital ground, dig in and wait for support, this again suggests bridges not hills.  

    Browning led the briefings, wrote the planning documents and wrote the book on airborne operations. Then last minute he goes weak for the Groesbeek heights, because that's where he wants his unnecessary HQ? A career solider with ambition overturns an entire mission plan at the last minute with a dangerously vague verbal order to a single officer and changes priorities?  This is such a sensational break from the expectations of professional soldiering, if I was Gavin I would have asked for that in writing! No such document has been found. But we all point the finger at Browning because Frost thinks so and Gavin says so?

    Frost wasn't on the ramp with Browning and Gavin when this last minute thing happened. He was soon after quite busy with his own end of the street. So he must have picked up the change of plan post-war. From whom? Gavin and Maxwell-Taylor were very important cold-war generals when Bridge Too Far and Frost memoirs were written, Browning was retired. Frost himself was raised to Major General in the Cold War, I fear politics may have taken a place in his recall. For sure no one was selling books or getting funding for movies by saying the Americans messed up when Maxwell-Taylor was head of the Pentagon in the mid 60s.  

    Like Frost I was not there to witness Gavins last chat with Browning, but I have been a solider and my career has been a detective, so my perspective is just that – coppers nose and a little experience. This Browning stuff doesn't smell right.

    A detectives perspective is different to that of a historian. Every document, memory and statement is self-serving, every scientific analysis can be turned on its head by a different scientist. Look at everything in your crime scenes, look closely at your witnesses, their motives and gains, and don't believe any of it. If everyone is pointing at one suspect, suspect the fingers.  If the culprit is obvious, you've missed something. Then ask yourself who benefits from the crime?

    Montgomery and Eisenhower had only recently had a blazing row. One which Monty only just survived. It was about his narrow front vs Ike's broad front strategy. If either were going anywhere Antwerp and its approaches had to be secured. To do it properly the whole of Southern Netherlands had to be taken. I had two uncles involved in the planning of this operation – both said independently that to secure Antwerp only the southern bank of the Waal was necessary. Nijmegen could be blown and Antwerp would be secure. Arnhem was a bridge too far for that vital objective. But if you wanted to get into Germany on a narrow front the land north of Arnhem is the springboard.

    Ike and Montys argument comes into perspective now. It wasn't the RAF who said make it a daylight drop, it wasn't the RAF who said one drop a day – that was Bereton and Ridgeway (both to prosper under President Eisenhower in the Cold War). It wasn't the British who failed to get to their bridges on day 1, it was the Americans. One of them the most vital bridge of the lot. Its almost like Ike didn't want Monty to get his foothold across the Rhine. Ike had to secure everything up to the Waal, he had to secure Antwerp and his generals accomplished that successfully. Monty plan was left hanging on the end of a narrow road in a swampy island adrift in mid Holland.

    That said it was also a big operation with many moving parts, against an enemy who was pretty good.

    Regarding Sossabawski, I don't think he deserved as much criticism as he did at Arnhem. But I don't think that was why he was sacked. Poland had only recently been sold upriver to the Russians by Roosevelt with Churchills grudging co-operation. Sossabawski was a prominent Free Polish Army officer with a link to the Polish Home Army. Funny how many prominent Poles were sidelined in those final years. Maczek was denied his Polish citizenship by Russia and a job, pension and position from the allies after the war. He ended up a bartender by 1947, and had a much greater call on allied success than Sossabawski. Poles were everywhere getting screwed over. If Browning was playing a part in that shame on him, but the shame starts with Roosevelt and Churchill and passes through many hands before Browning.

  65. From Monty, The Field Marshall by Nigel Hamilton:

    General Student, in a statement after the war,considered the ‘Market Garden’ Operation to have been proved to be a great success. At one stroke it brought the British 2nd Army into the possession of the vital bridges and valuable territory. The conquest of the Nijmegen area meant the creation of a good jumping board for the offensive which contributed to the end of the war.

  66. Horrocks said in "World at War" that he wanted to start as soon as humanly possible, when it was credibly verified that all that was defending the area was "The Stomach Brigade", and not II SS Panzer Corps. Of course, UK Bureaucracy of the time, won out

  67. Nobody is to blame. It was a worthwhile gamble that had a slim chance of paying off hugely. Blaming anyone on the field is like blaming the dice for losing the bet.

  68. I do not put much faith as he was 8 miles away does not know what was going in 82 area col frost could not even talk to his own division hq
    What cause market garden to fail was no one airborne division was dropped with enough mass
    Even if they 82 had taken the bridge they did not have enough combat power to hold against ss panzer division when it arrived
    30 Corp still would not have got to arnhem till on the 3 day because the bridge that was blown in 101 area
    Gavin had seen 82 in Normandy get blast off a bridge by not taking the high ground near the bridge

  69. The 82d Airborne troops were very scattered across a large area. Not enough were dropped into the right spot to initiate an attack on Nijmegen. If more soldiers could have been available right where they were needed then I am sure the outcome would have been different.

  70. From
    John Burns1 year ago
    "Ray Barata Market Garden failure to achieve 100% success can be put down to one failure – the failure to seize Nijmegen bridge immediately."

    John Burns1 year ago (edited)
    "Ray Barata First of all the operation was a success … "

  71. "On 16 September Ultra reports revealed the movement of the 9th SS and 10th SS Panzer Divisions to Nijmegen and Arnhem, creating enough concern for Eisenhower to send his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, to raise the issue with Montgomery on 10 September. However, Montgomery dismissed Smith's concerns and refused to alter the plans for the landing of 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem."

    Harclerode, Peter (2005), Wings Of War: Airborne Warfare 1918–1945, page 460

  72. On 16 September Ultra reports revealed the movement of the 9th SS and 10th SS Panzer Divisions to Nijmegen and Arnhem, creating enough concern for Eisenhower to send his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, to raise the issue with Montgomery

  73. Here’s my thought. Let’s say the 82nd captured the Nijmegen bridge on day 1. The Germans still could have gotten enough troops and tanks to overrun them because the British had not captured Arnhem bridge. You gotta remember, the 82nd was all over the Nijmegen area. And they had to capture a pretty big bridge with lightly armed troops. Anyone else thought of this?

  74. One of the most Dumbest plans of all time! The British was so arrogant they ignored intelligence from the Dutch Underground. That there was tanks in and around where they landed. They Thought that the Germans was already defeated. Not enough Planes to Land all of them at once.In my opinion it was General Bernard Law Montgomery's Failed Plan that set the Allies back. Very Sad! A lot of brave Men of all the Allies got Killed.

  75. Where were the British & US Air Forces to provide close air support?
    It seems that the German units could easily move during the daytime.

  76. Were the Allies so logistically strapped that no units could be deployed to advance and protect the flanks of XXX Corps spearhead?

  77. Bad Breaks for 1st AB As I understand it 1st AB commander knew nothing of airborne operations. Browning, commander of all airborne forces on the ground, had failed jump training and had never commanded airborne in combat and took 36 gliders (one battalions worth) for his HQ to Nijmegen, even though it would be redundant after XXX Corps made contact. The bombing of the anti aircraft and barracks at Arnhem alerted the SS, already in Oosterbeek FOR training, which set up a blocking line, road blocks and ambush's BEFORE the landing took place. "Special jeeps" were difficult to unload from damaged gliders (jeeps in Waco gliders usually unloaded themselves by bouncing the pilot and copilot out of the way). Center pontoon removed from one bridge, another bridge was blown up. 1st AB radios did not work properly from the beginning. Two US Army radio teams were unable to contact tactical air support, follow on air drops could not be contacted on 1st AB radios. Commanding general and two other high ranking officers were cut off and surrounded for two days. Of the 10,000 men landed at Arnhem no more than 800 made it to the bridge. On the plus side the north end of one bridge was lightly defended. So it's obvious it's the Yanks fault. photo jeep being off loaded from damaged Waco glider

  78. A. They were guarding Brownings' HQ and the glider landing zone for the next drop. 2. They took the bridge at Grave, the longest bridge in Europe and ten miles from the Waal bridges, in the first few hours. III. 406 Div. 2,300 Germans with 5 armored cars and 3 half tracks with quad 20mm. D. XXX Corps arrived at GRAVE at 0820, 10 miles from the Waal bridges. 5. When XXX Corps arrived at Grave they had averaged a little over one mile per hour. If they had continued at that pace they would have arrived at Arnhem bridge at around 0420 on the day Frosts' men ran out of ammo and had no control of the bridge. VI. There were 88mm and 20mm AA and about 550 rear echelon troops and one Luftwaffe (HG) company at the bridge before 9th SS Panzer arrived. 7. Around 0630 day two all forces not engaged had to retake the Heights for that days landing. The 406 Div. was retreating as the gliders landed around them and that was not the only battle. map Nijmegen day one

  79. I would agree with you in part of Browning Yes he should taken the share of the blame but Gavin knew the objective was the Bridge and should of gone for it. He had made his mind up once he hit the ground and once Browning was on the scene he got confirmation to keep going for the heights. It all depends on who landed first. I cannot see Browning being thrown into a combat situation, though some sources suggest this was the case. I just do not accept a high ranking British general would land in the first wave of the landings.

    My view was the Browning was on the scene but not in overall command of american forces. He did not direct the battle for Nijmagen. It is true that Browning did agree with Gavin about taking the heights, mainly because his headquarters were there (Browning). From what i read Browning did not order Gavin to take the heights but merely agreed with with Gavin's suggestion, or ideas. Browning was a fool to agree with him.

    So he should take the blame as superior officer but not one that was in overall command? Browning had nothing to do with directing the battle, it was purely an american affair. So who is blame? American or British general. I am in two minds, on the one hand it is Browning as he is the superior officer on the scene, but on the other he is not in over command. So its Gavin right? MM yes he was in command, he was given the order to take the bridge. The bridge was the main point of the attack. If the Bridge does not fall into allied hands then the whole battle is pointless. Later on Browning covers for Gavin and said he ordered him to take the heights.

    So who was directing operations at Nijmagen? It certainly was not Browning but Gavin. So Browning's assumption of taking responsibility does not hold as he was not in command. If Browning was in overall command and directed the battle for Nijmegan then it is his fault for the mess. Yet i have not read any source he was in command. Gavin was in command and despite having a superior officer on the scene, Gavin directed the battle.

    Gavin would of known to mess about digging in with paratroopers is stupid. He should of got the bridge on the first day. In fact Gavin's plan was very similar to what the British did at Arnhem. Protect the landing zones and then go for the bridges. I can understand the Brits doing that as they need supplies and reinforcements fast. One would of thought Gavin would want XXX corp to come very fast and get the across the Bridges et al.

    This book arguments that Gavin not Browning ordered the defence of the Groesbeek Heights not the bridges. Which seems to confirms my believe Gavin just asked Browning about his tactic of concentrating on the heights and Browning agreed. So Gavin took the decision and he alone acted it out and thus is to blame for the delay at Nijmagen. https://www.amazon.com/dp/B005EH7CIW

    So to conclude Gavin was a tactility to blame for the mess at Nijmagen, and Brown was to blame over all for the mess because he was the superior officer on the scene.

  80. The whole scene around Monty was to blame, because the presence of SS troops and SS panzers in the vicinity was laughed away totally! That was also the reason that 82d airborne met mutch stronger resistance at the Waal bridge as expected so they failed to take the bridge the first day by the battalion of major Talton-Long. By the way I don't learn anything about the British airbornes landing too fatr from the Arnhem bridge, in stead of jumping at both sides of it, wich idea was refused by the RAF! The main reason for the operation was Monty's prestige!

  81. The key issue of Market Garden was the taking of all bridges within a time frame.
    The 36 hours delay at Nijmegen due to taking the hights first, was the critical factor for failure of Market Garden, so I am with Frost !

  82. The failure of operation market garden was the resourcefulness and tenacity for the German forces. They accomplished an amazing allied defeat with a patchwork defence. The credit needs to go where it’s deserved. Yes there were items that attributed to their defeat however the Germans one the final battle and battles afterwards to hold this area despite continued allied offensives.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *